According to Jacob Bernoulli, even the`stupidest man' knows that the larger one's sample of observations, the more con®dence one can have in being close to the truth about the phenomenon observed. Two-and-a-half centuries later, psychologists empirically tested people's intuitions about sample size. One group of such studies found participants attentive to sample size; another found participants ignoring it. We suggest an explanation for a substantial part of these inconsistent ®ndings. We propose the hypothesis that human intuition conforms to the`empirical law of large numbers' and distinguish between two kinds of tasks Ð one that can be solved by this intuition (frequency distributions) and one for which it is not sucient (sampling distributions). A review of the literature reveals that this distinction can explain a substantial part of the apparently inconsistent results.
Jacob Bernoulli, who formulated the ®rst version of the law of large numbers, asserted in a letter to Leibniz that`even the stupidest man knows by some instinct of nature per se and by no previous instruction' that the greater the number of con®rming observations, the surer the conjecture (Gigerenzer et al., 1989, p. 29) . Two-and-a-half centuries later, psychologists began to study whether people actually take into account information about sample size in judgements of various kinds. The results turned out to be contradictory: One group of studies seemed to con®rm, a second to discon®rm the`instinct of nature' assumed by Bernoulli. In this paper, we propose an explanation that accounts for a substantial part of the contradictory results reported in the literature. explanation has been found for why people sometimes take sample size into account and sometimes do not.
Why do people sometimes attend to sample size and sometimes not? In this paper, we propose an explanation for a substantial part of the contradictory results. We shall argue (1) that common intuitions about sample size conform to the empirical law of large numbers (a`prehistoric' version of the mathematical law of large numbers, see below), and (2) that this law works only for one group of sample-size problems (which concern frequency distributions) but not for a second type (which concern sampling distributions). If this conjecture is valid, one should ®nd that frequency distribution problems have been typically used by those who reported that people attend to sample size, and sampling distribution problems by those who concluded that people largely ignore sample size.
The empirical law of large numbers is not to be confused with the (mathematical) law of large numbers. The mathematical law of large numbers is about a situation in which the sample size approaches in®nity, whereas none of the studies reviewed here deals with this situation, but with ®nite sample sizes. Nevertheless, several researchers have described people's reasoning as following the`law of large numbers' (if they attend to ®nite sample sizes) or as violating it (if they do not). Because this misconception is widespread, we clarify in the Appendix what the law of large numbers is, why it does not apply to this research on sample size, and which mathematical results do apply.
THE EMPIRICAL LAW OF LARGE NUMBERS
What is the`empirical law of large numbers'? Before the ®rst law of large numbers was formulated by Jacob Bernoulli, there existed a`prehistoric' version of the law. As Daston (1988, p. 234) observed, Gerolamo Cardano, Edmund Halley, and the author of the last chapters of the Port Royal Logique, had appealed to the principle that there was an approximate ®t between observed frequencies and true' probabilities which improved as the number of observations increased'. This intuition Ð that larger samples generally lead to more accurate estimates of population means Ð is commonly referred to as the`empirical law of large numbers ' (e.g. Freudenthal, 1972) or the`law of averages' (e.g. Freedman et al., 1991) . The empirical law of large numbers is a common-sensical intuition and not a mathematical theorem like the (mathematical) law of large numbers. When Bernoulli spoke of aǹ instinct of nature', he was referring to the empirical law of large numbers as a general human intuition. Note that the empirical law of large numbers says nothing more than that a large sample is better than a small sample for estimating a population parameter.
The hypothesis that common intuitions about sample size can be expressed by the empirical law of large numbers has an important implication. The empirical law of large numbers pertains to the accuracy of estimates derived from frequency distributions (as in Piaget and Inhelder's tasks) , but by itself is not sucient to capture the relation between variability and size of samples in sampling distributions (as in Kahneman and Tversky's tasks, see below) . The empirical law of large numbers therefore leads us to distinguish between two kinds of tasks: (1) frequency distribution tasks, in which participants judge how well a sample mean (a mean of frequency distribution) estimates a population mean and (2) sampling distribution tasks, in which participants judge the variance of sampling distributions. These two kinds of tasks have rarely been distinguished in research on intuitions about sample size, leading us to derive the prediction that studies reporting attention to sample size used frequency distribution tasks, while those reporting disregard of sample size used sampling distribution tasks.
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS AND SAMPLING DISTRIBUTIONS
A frequency distribution is a distribution of values from one sample. The overall range of values is divided into categories and the number of cases in each category is recorded. An example including a quantitative variable is the frequency distribution of heights in a sample of Italian men, where the categories might be 160 cm, 161 cm, 162 cm, and so on; an example with a qualitative (binary) variable is the distribution of male and female births during one day at a certain hospital.
We will use the term`sampling distribution' for a distribution of means from independent samples of ®xed size, drawn from the same population. A sampling distribution is not about the frequency of observations in dierent categories but about the frequency (or probability) of sample means falling into dierent categories. 1 The height distribution of 100 randomly sampled Italian men is a frequency distribution; the distribution of height means in repeated random samples of 100 Italian men is a sampling distribution.
The dierence between the variance of frequency and sampling distributions is particularly evident in the limiting case in which the sample includes the whole population. In such a case, a frequency distribution will be identical to the population distribution. A sampling distribution, however, will ultimately converge into a distribution concentrated at a single value: all sample means will be identical to the population mean, and the variance of the sampling distribution will be zero.
We will now examine whether the distinction between frequency and sampling distributions can account for a substantial part of the inconsistent results.
A PROPOSAL TO RESOLVE INCONSISTENT RESULTS
Two kinds of sampling distribution tasks have been used in the literature, one in which participants have to make a choice regarding speci®c parts of a sampling distribution and one in which participants have to construct a sampling distribution. We begin by analyzing the`choice tasks'.
Choice tasks
We ®rst consider all the studies of which we are aware that involve sampling distribution tasks and compare the results with participants' performance on analogous frequency distribution tasks. Because directly comparable frequency distribution tasks are rare in the literature, we will later analyze frequency distribution tasks that have no sampling distribution analogues.
An example of a problem that has been formulated both as what we call a sampling distribution task and a frequency distribution task is the`maternity ward' problem (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972, p. 443 ; the wording of the two following versions is that of Evans and Dusoir, 1977, pp 
. 133±134):
Maternity ward problem A certain town is served by two hospitals. In the larger hospital about 45 babies are born each day, and in the smaller hospital about 15 babies are born each day. As you know, about 50% of all babies are boys. The exact percentage of baby boys, however, varies from day to day. Sometimes it may be higher than 50%, sometimes lower.
Sampling distribution version
For a period of 1 year, each hospital recorded the days on which more than 60% of the babies born were boys. Which hospital do you think recorded more such days?
Frequency distribution version Which hospital do you think is more likely to ®nd on one day that more than 60% of babies born were boys?
In the sampling distribution version, repeated samples of average sizes n 15 and n 45, respectively are drawn for 365 days (one year). Participants can solve the task if they realize that the variance of the sampling distribution for the smaller hospital is greater than that for the larger hospital. Evans and Dusoir (1977) constructed the frequency distribution version (this is our term, not theirs) in order to`simplify' the task with respect to```on one day'' as opposed to``most days included in the year '' ' (p. 134) . This reduces the number of samples from 365 to one and the task is now to judge`the probability of the outcome of a single speci®ed trial which constitutes our simpli®ed version' (p. 135). Evans and Dusoir consider the dierence as merely one of`complexity' (p. 135). We argue instead that the second version has all the features of a frequency distribution task and therefore can be solved by the empirical law of large numbers, which again states that a proportion from a larger sample is a more accurate estimator of the population proportion than one from a smaller sample. Because the proportion from the larger sample is more likely to be close to the true proportion (50%), a deviation from the true proportion by 10% or more (`more than 60%') would be more likely to be found in the smaller sample. The empirical law of large numbers, however, cannot be applied to the sampling distribution version, because it is not explicit about how the variance of the distribution of the proportions depends on sample size.
A second example of a problem that has been formulated both as a frequency and a sampling distribution task is the`post oce problem' (Well, Pollatsek, and Boyce, 1990, p. 297 ,`tail version' and accuracy version'):
Post oce problem When they turn 18, American males must register for the draft at a local post oce. In addition to other information, the height of each male is obtained. The national average height of 18-year-old males is 5 feet, 9 inches.
Every day for one year, 25 men registered at post oce A and 100 men registered at post oce B. At the end of each day, a clerk at each post oce computed and recorded the average height of the men who had registered there that day. Which would you expect to be true? (circle one)
1. The number of days on which the average height was 6 feet or more was greater for post oce A than post oce B. 2. The number of days on which the average height was 6 feet or more was greater for post oce B than for post oce A. 3. There is no reason to expect that the number of days on which the average height was 6 feet or more was greater for one post oce than for the other.
Frequency distribution version
Yesterday, 25 men registered at post oce A and 100 men registered at post oce B. At the end of the day, a clerk at each post oce computed and recorded the average height of the men who registered there that day.
Which would you expect to be true? (circle one)
1. The average height at post oce A was closer to the national average than was the average height at post oce B. 2. The average height at post oce B was closer to the national average than was the average height at post oce A. 3. There is no reason to think that the average height was closer to the national average at one post oce than at the other.
In the sampling distribution version, repeated samples of sizes n 25 and n 100, respectively, are drawn for 365 days (one year). Participants can solve the task if they realize that the variance of the sampling distribution for post oce A is greater than that for post oce B. In the frequency distribution version, only one sample per post oce is taken. Well, Pollatsek, and Boyce (1990) draw the same distinction between frequency and sampling distributions as we do (which they call distribution of scores and distributions of averages, respectively) but conclude that the distinction does not explain their results. They used, as did Evans and Dusoir, several other versions of the problem, which we have included in our analysis in Exhibit 1. We will now analyze the entire body of evidence available on participants' performance in choice tasks.
Evidence
The vast majority of studies employing sampling distribution tasks have two characteristic features: (1) a choice task (as opposed to an estimation or con®dence task) with (2) three choices involving two sample sizes. In most cases these three response alternatives were explicitly stated as`larger sample', smaller sample', and`no dierence'; in others they were embedded as in the post oce problem. We will consider two-alternative forced-choice tasks and studies using other dependent variables later because these cannot be directly compared to the three-alternative tasks described above. We have found 35 studies (in eight articles) that satisfy these two criteria. Most of the studies investigated whether some factor would facilitate the use of sample-size information, such as the ratio of sample sizes (e.g.`1,000 versus 5' births instead of`45 versus 15' births). We determined the unit of a`study' as follows: If, within an article, one problem (such as the maternity ward problem) was given to two (or more) independent groups of participants, the results of each group were coded as a separatè study'. If one group of participants worked on more than one frequency distribution task (or sampling distribution task), then we counted these problems as one study, and the result reported in Exhibit 1 is the weighed average across these problems. If participants had to work on both frequency and sampling distribution tasks, then the results were coded as two separate studies. Exhibit 1 divides the studio into sampling distribution tasks and frequency distribution tasks.
The results are shown in the form of a stem-and-leaf display. The display shows the percentage of participants who made the correct choices for frequency distribution tasks (left side) and sampling distribution tasks (right side). The`stem' (the central, vertical part of Exhibit 1) represents the ten's place and the`leaves' represent the one's place of the percentage of correct choices. For sampling distribution tasks, the percentage of correct choices ranges between 7% and 59% while for frequency distribution tasks, the range is from 56% to 87%. The medians are 33% and 76%, respectively, and there is almost no overlap between the two distributions of percentages. Note that the median of correct answers for the sampling distribution tasks is exactly what one would expect by chance, that is, if participants had randomly picked one of the three alternatives. Exhibit 1 shows that there is an explanation for the apparently contradictory result that people sometimes do take sample size into account and sometimes do not. The distinction between sampling distribution tasks and frequency distribution tasks account for most of the dierences within this group of studies. Note that none of the studies reported in Exhibit 1 was designed for the analysis we have made except the study by Sedlmeier (1994) . Interestingly, the results of the latter study (32% and 75% correct choices for the sampling and the frequency distribution tasks, respectively) match the medians for all studies (33% and 76%). A few studies were not included in Exhibit 1 because they diered from the others in two respects. First, in one article (Jones and Harris, 1982, Experiments I and II) , three sample sizes had to be compared. There were two choice problems, one a frequency distribution task (`Question 1') and the other a sampling distribution task (`Question 2'). No dierence in performance was found between the two tasks, which is inconsistent with our hypothesis. However, in a second frequency distribution task (a simple Galton board, see Exhibit 2), 94% of the participants took sample size into account. The main result was that if participants had`hands-on' experience with the Galton board prior to working on the two other tasks, then the proportion of correct answers in these tasks approximately doubled.
Second, a few other studies used only two response categories. As Reagan (1989) demonstrated, if the`same' response category is eliminated and participants are forced to choose either the`smaller sample' or`larger sample' response, then the proportion of correct choices increases considerably (by over 30 percentage points). For this reason, results from studies without the`same' category cannot be directly compared to those in Exhibit 1. But frequency and sampling distribution tasks that both use only two response categories each can be directly compared. Evans and Dusoir (1977) report 55% and 70% correct answers for their sampling distribution tasks (as mentioned previously, this is our term, not theirs) and 85% and 85% for their frequency distribution tasks. This dierence between frequency and sampling distribution tasks is smaller than the median dierence in Exhibit 1, but points in the same direction (0 0X26Y p 0X02, combined). Exhibit 1. Stem-and-leaf display of percentages of participants taking sample size into account in multiple-choice studies. Results are shown separately for frequency distribution tasks (left leaves, N 6 studies) and sampling distribution tasks (right leaves, N 29 studies). The stem represents the ten's place, and the leaves represent the one's place. For instance, the top row of the diagram`| 0 | 7, 8' represents two studies (sampling distribution tasks) where 7% and 8% of participants took sample size into account. Studies are taken from the following sources: Bar-Hillel (1979 ; Kahneman and Tversky (1972) ; Murray, Iding, Farris, and Revlin (1987) ; Reagan (1989) ; Sedlmeier (1994) ; Swieringa, Gibbins, Larsson, and Sweeney (1976); and Well et al., (1990) . See text for further explanation
To summarize, the studies we have analyzed were heterogeneous in the sense that they employed a broad range of variables that did or did not in¯uence the use of sample size. Despite this heterogeneity, the distinction between frequency and sampling distribution tasks was shown to be a strong predictor of participants' use of sample-size information.
Beyond choice tasks
Exhibit 1 contains only a few frequency distribution tasks because these tasks often involved dependent variables other than choice, such as con®dence judgements about the accuracy of means of dierently sized samples, quantitative estimates of population means given two samples of dierent size, and open-ended answers, to name a few. We have analyzed all studies known to us that use frequency distribution tasks in which (1) sample size was the only independent variable or, if there were several independent variables, they were systematically varied with sample size, 2 and (2) the assumptions underlying three well-known mathematical results that justify the superiority of larger samples (variance of means, Chebychev's inequality, and central limit theorem Ð see Appendix) were satis®ed. The key assumption is that random variables Ð such as`height' or`gender' Ð are independently and identically distributed.
3 Exhibit 2 shows 17 articles representing 35 studies (not counting Piaget and Inhelder's single-case studies), where a`study' is de®ned as in Exhibit 1. Exhibit 2 summarizes the kind of task, the measure, and the results in each study.
Do the results concerning the use of sample-size information in frequency distribution tasks reported in Exhibit 1 hold up in Exhibit 2? The 17 articles report a broad variety of dependent measures and experimental conditions. We do not see any way to compare these studies directly as in Exhibit 1, but it is useful to look at the general magnitude of the eect on performance due to the experimental variation of sample size. We calculated the eect sizes r, q, and when the necessary information was given (Exhibit 2). The measure r expresses eect size as a Pearson correlation coecient, the measure can be treated as r for practical purposes, and q is the dierence between Fisher z transformed correlations (Cohen, 1988; Rosenthal and Rosnow, 1991 ). Cohen's conventions for what constitutes a small, medium, or large eect size are identical for the three measures. The median eect size obtained in these studies (one per study) by varying sample size is 0.43, a medium to large eect by Cohen's standards. In only 4 out of 35 studies was sample size largely neglected (Evans and Dusoir, 1977, Experiment 1; Jones and Harris, 1982 , Question 4 in Experiment 1; Jepson, Krantz and Nisbett, 1983, Study 1; Evans and Pollard, 1985, Experiment 2) .
With few exceptions, the studies in Exhibit 2 show that participants generally take sample size into account in frequency distribution tasks. There is no simple, quantitative way to compare the amount of use of sample-size information in Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 1. In Exhibit 2 the eect size found in a proportion to the expected value. Only 22% of subjects showed sensitivity to sample size in the counters problem (one experiment) ( problems subjects took sample size into account in these two problems, on average). In Study 2, sample size was taken into account in 82% of solutions for`probabilistic' problems (four out of ®ve problems met criteria) and in 57% of solutions for`objective' problems (one out of ®ve met criteria; none of the`subjective' problems met criteria) Text problems Prediction of which of two Larger sample leads to higher con®dence (probability (abilities, traits) people will get higher ranking estimate) in prediction (laypeople: q 0X42 and q 0X31; on various abilities or traits psychologists: q 0X55 and q 0X19 for abilities and traits, respectively)
Text problems Prediction of which of two Larger sample leads to higher con®dence (probability (abilities, traits) people will get higher ranking estimate) in prediction (q 0X69 and q 0X81 for abilities on various abilities or traits and traits, respectively) (within-subjects design)
Kunda and Nisbett
Text problems Prediction of which of two Presence of larger sample mostly leads to higher con®dence (1986b, Study 1) [1] (abilities, traits) people will get higher ranking (probability estimate) in prediction (within-subjects on various abilities or traits condition: q 0X59 and q 0X26; q 0X74 and q 0X14; (both between-and withinq À0X07 and q À0X1; between-subjects condition: subjects conditions) q 0X42 and q 0X23; q 0X61 and q 0X12; q À0X08 and q À0X13)
Text problems Prediction of which of two Presence of larger sample mostly leads to higher (abilities, traits) people will get higher con®dence (probability estimate) in prediction (q 0X46 ranking on various abilities and q 0X68; q 0X74 and q 0X41; q À0X24 and or traits (within-subjects q À0X02 design) Koslowski et al. (1989) [3] Text problems Rating of likelihood of causal College students took sample size into account both (stories) relationship between an when a`target factor' covaried with an`eect' and eect' and a`target factor' when it did not; 6th and 9th graders did so only in the latter case
Sanitioso and Kunda Text problems Prediction of which of two
Larger sample leads to higher con®dence (probability (1991) [2] (sports) people will get higher scores estimate) in prediction (r 0X46 in Study 1 and in athletic competition r 0X4 in Study 2)
Note. The criteria for the selection of studies are explained in the text and footnote 3. a We calculated the eect sizes r, and q (Cohen, 1988; Rosenthal and Rosnow, 1991) when sucient information was available. b The choice tasks in this article have already been discussed. c Kunda and Nisbett (1986a,b) transformed subjects' probability estimates into correlations. The q's reported here express the dierences between the Fisher z transformed correlations (taken from Kunda and Nisbett's 1986a,b ®gures) of the large (total-to-total) and the small (item-to-item) samples. d The`item-to-item' condition was compared with the`total-to-total',`total-to-item', and`item-to-total' conditions for abilities and traits in each case.
typical study relates to the dierence in con®dence estimates for small and large samples, whereas in Exhibit 1 it relates to the percentage of participants choosing one out of three possible answers. Thus, in Exhibit 1, 33% is the expected result by chance (e.g. if participants choose randomly among the three alternatives), which would correspond to an eect size of zero. As mentioned earlier, the median percentage in the studies using a sampling distribution task was exactly 33% (Exhibit 1). Therefore the medium-to large-sized eects in Exhibit 2 are consistent with the pattern for frequency distribution tasks (as opposed to the sampling distribution tasks) shown in Exhibit 1. People seem to apply the empirical law of large numbers not only to frequency distribution tasks that are directly comparable to sampling distribution tasks but also to frequency distribution tasks with a wide range of dependent variables.
Constructing distributions
We will now use the distinction between frequency and sampling distributions to suggest what participants do when they are asked to construct sampling distributions. The empirical law of large numbers by itself is not sucient to explain how sample size aects the variance of sampling distribution. Therefore, intuitions about sample size as expressed by the empirical law of large numbers cannot help in constructing sampling distributions. Two major results have been obtained in construction tasks to date (Fischho, Slovic, and Lichtenstein, 1979; Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Olson, 1976; Teigen, 1974a) : (1) sampling distributions did not vary with sample size, and (2) they were¯atter than what would be expected for even the smallest sample size. 4 We propose a tentative explanation for these two results: participants construct frequency distributions when asked to construct sampling distributions. This proposal can account for both results.
Does the variance of a frequency distribution change systematically with sample size? The sample variance s 2 is an unbiased estimator of the population variance. That is, its expected value is equal to the value of the population variance, irrespective of sample size (e.g. Huntsberger and Billingsley, 1973, p. 138) . With a sample of any size, the best estimate of the population variance s 2 is s 2 . Thus if participants construct frequency distributions, the distributions should not vary with sample size Ð the ®rst result. A frequency distribution, in addition, can always be expected to be¯atter than a corresponding sampling distribution for n b 1. Therefore, if participants construct frequency distributions, these distributions should be¯atter than sampling distributions even for small sample sizes Ð the second result.
This tentative explanation is supported by three pieces of further evidence. First, participants can construct realistic frequency distributions. Teigen (1974b) reported that the distributions participants constructed for the heights of male and female students were close to the actual (population) distributions (after probabilities and frequencies were normalized to add up to 100%). Second, participants tend to recall sampling distribution tasks as frequency distribution tasks. Well, Pollatsek, and Boyce (1990, Experiment 4) had their participants recall the contents of a sampling distribution task and found that 11 of 21 participants who failed on the sampling distribution task recalled the task as a frequency distribution task and only 3 participants recalled it as a sampling distribution task. Third, participants tend to construct identical distributions when asked to construct frequency or sampling distributions. The present account implies (as has been demonstrated in previous research) that participants' sampling distributions do not vary with sample size and, more interestingly, that their sampling distributions should be indistinguishable from their frequency distributions. Sedlmeier (1994, Study 2) extended Kahneman and Tversky's (1972) study on sampling distributions of the heights of Israeli soldiers. In Sedlmeier's study, participants were asked to construct both sampling and frequency distributions of dierent-size samples. One group of participants (N 55) constructed sampling distributions of the height of Israeli soldiers for sample sizes of 20 and 200 (similar to previous research). A second group of participants (N 56) constructed frequency distributions of these heights for sample sizes of 20 and 200. If participants construct frequency distributions when asked to construct sampling distributions, then the distributions they constructed should be the same in all four conditions. Comparison of the distributions constructed for sample sizes of 20 and 200 showed that for each height category, the median dierence between the two sample-size conditions (n 20 and n 200) was zero, similar to what has been found in earlier studies. The new result was that this held both for sampling distributions (where it should not) and for frequency distributions (where it should). The median distributions in the four conditions were virtually identical. This result is consistent with our argument that participants construct frequency distributions when asked to construct sampling distributions: (1) participants' sampling distributions are indistinguishable from their frequency distributions and (2) their sampling distributions show the frequency-distribution characteristic of being independent of sample size.
DISCUSSION
Why did one group of studies report that people take sample size into account when they should, while another group reported that people ignored sample size? We proposed the hypothesis that human intuition conforms to the empirical law of large numbers and distinguished between two kinds of tasks Ð one for which this intuition is sucient (frequency distributions) and one for which it is not (sampling distributions).
5 A review of the literature showed that this distinction can explain a substantial part of the apparently inconsistent results. Speci®cally, the evidence showed that (1) frequency distribution problems that are directly comparable to sampling distribution problems elicit substantially higher percentages of participants who take sample size into account, with almost no overlap between the distributions of percentages; and (2) frequency distribution problems not directly comparable to sampling distribution problems result in participants' generally taking sample size into account. We also proposed, tentatively, what participants do if they have to construct sampling distributions: they construct frequency distributions.
We do not mean to imply that there are no factors aside from the distinction between frequency and sampling distribution tasks that in¯uence the use of sample size. For choice tasks, for instance, several such factors have been reported, including`hands-on' experience with a simple Galton board (Jones and Harris, 1982) , dierent ratios of sample size (Murray et al., 1987) , extreme`cut-o ' percentages (Bar-Hillel, 1979 Evans and Dusoir, 1977) , and the part of the distribution to which the question refers (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Reagan, 1989) . Comparatively high attention to sample size has been reported when the question posed to the participants referred to the center (as opposed to the tails) of the distribution (Well, Pollatsek, and Boyce, 1990) , but this variant seems to have been studied P. Sedlmeier and G. Gigerenzer Intuitions About Sample Size 45 only for sampling distribution tasks. There is some indication that population size can in¯uence judgements about sample size (Evans and Bradshaw, 1986) . For instance, Bar-Hillel (1979) proposed that it is not (absolute) sample size but relative sample size (relative to the population size) that people attend to, but her data only partially support this hypothesis (e.g. the results of her Problems 6 and 7 seem to be inconsistent).
6
All in all, the distinction between frequency and sampling distributions Ð a distinction which has received little attention so far Ð seems to be a powerful one in dierentiating between tasks in which people do or do not take account of sample size. For the studies reviewed in Exhibit 1, we do not know of any other factor that can produce a similar clear separation.
The empirical law of large numbers re¯ects an intuition that people seem to apply to a variety of situations. Where does the intuitive quality of the empirical law of large numbers come from? Research on animal foraging might provide some hints. Bumble-bees, for example, have been noted to be highly sensitive to frequency distributions. Their behavior covaries with changing means and variances in distributions of nectar (Real, 1991) . Birds also show sensitivity to means and variances of variables relevant to their survival (Real and Caraco, 1986) . When choosing between several foraging alternatives (e.g.¯owers of a certain type), it is evolutionarily adaptive to have computational rules (or`intuitions') about how to estimate the`gain' (mean) and the`risk' (variance) associated with a speci®c alternative. Although the literature on foraging documents that animals adapt to changes in frequency distributions, we know of no studies that focus on animals' use of sample size in sampling distributions.
Foraging is one important adaptive task in which intuitions about frequency distributions play a central role. But estimates of means and proportions are of more general importance in everyday life. For instance, many cultures value the knowledge of older men and women, presumably because they can draw on a larger sample of observations than younger people in making predictions about the behavior of nature and humans. So the intuition that estimates and predictions based on larger samples tend to be more accurate might just be the cumulative result of millennia of experience.
Why is the role of sample size in sampling distributions so hard to grasp? One consideration is that frequency distributions are involved in everyday problems of estimation and prediction, whereas the rule that the variability of a sampling distribution decreases with increasing sample size seems to have only few applications in ordinary life. In general, taking repeated samples and looking at the distribution of their means is rare in the everyday and only recent in scienti®c practice. For instance, the pioneers of systematic experimentation in the nineteenth century, such as the British agriculturist James F. W. Johnston and German physicist and mathematician Gustav Radicke, seemed to have no intuitions about the concept of a sampling distribution in making inferences about means (Gigerenzer6 One reviewer suggested that sampling distribution tasks are less often solved than frequency distribution tasks because they are more dicult to understand. One of us (Sedlmeier, unpublished data) tested this conjecture by making participants' task as clear as possible, using a visual demonstration of the task on a computer screen. Participants who had to solve frequency distribution tasks saw on a computer screen how samples of a particular size (e.g. the number of births on one day in a hospital) were drawn and how the proportion/mean for a sample was calculated (e.g. the birth rate for boys in hospital for one speci®c day). Participants who had to solve sampling distribution tasks watched the same demonstrations and, in addition, were shown how several proportions/means were placed as points in a corresponding sampling distribution. Only one sample size was used for the demonstrations. After the demonstrations, participants were prompted to ask when they found it dicult to understand the tasks; none indicated such a diculty. One group of participants saw demonstrations for three sampling distribution tasks from Kahneman and Tversky (1972; `maternity-ward',`word-length', and`height' tasks) and afterwards performed these tasks; and another group saw demonstrations for three corresponding frequency distribution tasks and afterwards performed those. The result was that 39% of the sampling distribution tasks and 73% of the frequency distribution tasks were solved (n 11 in each group). This dierence is consistent with those reported in this paper, despite an eort to eliminate potential misunderstandings of`what the task is' in sampling distribution tasks. Thus, there was no evidence that mere lack of understanding can explain the dierence between sampling and frequency problems. in theories of hypothesis testing, but the role of sample size in sampling distributions still seems to be poorly understood by many contemporary researchers. For example, the power of signi®cance tests (which depends on sample size) is widely ignored and (possibly, as a result) low in many experiments (Oakes, 1986; Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer, 1989; Tversky and Kahneman, 1971) . Even in statistics proper, where the theoretical concept of repeated sampling from the same population (proposed by Jerzy Neyman and Egon S. Pearson, among others) is widely used, doubt has been expressed about its relevance to actual scienti®c practice. Ronald A. Fisher (1956) , for instance, did not believe in the reality of repeated sampling in science and ridiculed this conception as having stemmed from`the fantasy of circles [i.e., mathematicians] rather remote from scienti®c research' (p. 100).
Thus with the exception of statisticians and their kin, humans may have experienced little selective pressure to develop intuitions about the impact of sample size on the variance of sampling distributions. The empirical law of large numbers, in contrast, seems to be an intuition sucient for understanding the role of sample size in everyday life. We may conclude that Jacob Bernoulli was correct in asserting that humans possess an`instinct of nature' that attends to sample-size information. The psychological literature reviewed here suggests that this instinct is akin to the empirical law of large numbers.
APPENDIX
This appendix clari®es what the law of large numbers is, why it does not apply to the psychological research on sample size, and which mathematical results do apply.
What is the law of large numbers? Simeon Denis Poisson (1837) was the ®rst to introduce the term`law of large numbers' for Bernoulli's theorem, which had been published posthumously in Ars Conjectandi (1713). In modern notation, Bernoulli's version of the theorem can be stated as follows (Stigler, 1986, p. 66) . Suppose an experiment with two possible outcomes is to be repeated many times. If p is the probability of success in any single experiment, and if non-negative numbers e and c are speci®ed, then the number of trials n can be determined such that the number of observed successes m in n trials satis®es
The setup described above is known today as a`Bernoulli process'. Bernoulli himself used an urn model with r`fertile' and s`sterile' equally likely cases so that p rar s. He set 4 equal to 1ar s and proposed making c large enough to ensure`moral certainty'. Bernoulli calculated the number of trials required for the case in which r 30 and s 20 and, because he had high standards of moral certainty, for c 1000Y 10,000, and 100,000 (Bernoulli, 1713, p. 238) . For c 1000 Ð where the probability P of m/n falling within the interval [29/50, 31/50] is at least 1000 times larger than the probability of m/n falling outside of that interval Ð he calculated that he would need at least n 25,550 observations. This discouragingly large number might have been one reason for the abrupt conclusion of his Ars Conjectandi (Stigler, 1986, p. 77) . A ®rst confusion abut the theorem stems from Bernoulli himself. The theorem assumes that p is known. However, Bernoulli also seems to have wanted to apply his theorem (illegitimately) to calculate the probability that the observed ratio m/n equalled an unknown p (Daston, 1988, p. 232; Pearson, 1925, p. 205) .
The modern reformulation of Bernoulli's theorem (e.g. Maistrov, 1974, p. 201) considers only the limiting case. In a more general form (which applies to means as well as proportions) going beyond Bernoulli processes, the law of large numbers can be stated as follows: Assume that the X i i 1Y 2Y X X X are independently and identically distributed random variables, each having a ®nite mean EX i ". Then, as n becomes arbitrarily large, the probability that the deviation of the mean of the random variables X i from their expected value " exceeds 4 approaches 0. In formal terms (for a proof see Scheaer, 1990, p. 282 Equation (A2) is a version of what is known as the`weak law of large numbers'. The most general form of the weak law of large numbers was proven by the Russian mathematician Khintchine (Feller, 1957, p. 229) . The strong law of large numbers is often taken as the theoretical basis for deriving probabilities from relative frequencies (Feller, 1957, pp. 189±190) . For Bernoulli trials, where x i is a 0±1 indicator variable, it can be written as 1 A3 (Fine, 1973, p. 95) . There are several versions of both the weak and strong law of large numbers (ReÂ veÂ sz, 1968 ). When we refer to the`law of large numbers' hereafter, we refer to equation (A2).
Why does the law of large numbers not apply to psychological research on sample size? The asymptotic feature (i.e. n 3 I) of the law of large numbers makes it an inappropriate model for determining how participants should solve tasks in which sample sizes are ®nite. As far as we know, all empirical studies on the`law of large numbers' have used ®nite sample sizes. However, as we can see from the previous section, the (mathematical) law of large numbers cannot justify these claims nor can Bernoulli's formulation of the theorem, which although it can be used for ®nite samples, is designed for a dierent purpose. Bernoulli's theorem allows for the determination of a ®nite n, given c, but the calculation of n rests on the knowledge of p. This is not the question addressed in research on the`law of large numbers', where n is always given, p is sometimes given, and the question typically relates to c.
If not the law of large numbers, what else could serve as a normative basis for determining when and why to consider sample sizes in judgements?
What mathematical results justify the impact of sample size? There are three dierent mathematical results that provide partial justi®cations. The simplest result pertains to the variance of the sample mean. For a sequence of independently and identically distributed random variables X i with ®nite variance ' 2 , the variance of the mean " X (in a sample of size n) is ' 2 an. Thus the variance of the mean decreases with increasing n (hereafter, the term`mean' is assumed to include`proportion' as well). This consideration provides a ®rst partial justi®cation for the superiority of larger samples. However, it does not allow for speci®cation of the distribution of the mean and, consequently, is mute as to how probable it is for " X to lie within a speci®ed interval. The second result, Chebychev's inequality, provides information about the upper bound of the probability that the dierence between mean and expectation is greater than or equal to an arbitrarily small number 4.
